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Abstract 
 
 
This study explores the development of the Concerted European Response 
from adoption of the European Action Plan by the euro group, to the adoption of 
the Economic Recovery Plan by the European Council. The theoretical framework 
employed to assess this process is based on the works of the Copenhagen School 
on securitisation. However, In order to analyse the economic and financial crisis 
through a security perspective this study moves away from the state-centric 
perspective employed in traditional security analysis and introduces a new 
conceptualisation of the referent object.  
The perceived security threat associated with the economic and financial crisis 
evolved considerably during the course of the autumn.  This transition reflects the 
evolution of the crisis from turmoil in the financial markets to recession. By 
referring to the crisis as something existentially threatening European policy-
makers moved to legitimise measures that during normal circumstances would 
have been considered impossible. The Heads of State and Government, and the 
Commission, thus securitised the economic and financial crisis in order to justify 
the implementation of extraordinary measures to arrest the threatening 
development. 
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1 Introduction 
 
What began as a credit market disruption in 2007 soon led to the most severe 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. Originating primarily in the United 
States, the crisis proved to be highly contagious and complex. The disorder in the 
financial markets occurred as banks sought to determine the true value of assets 
that were no longer traded in sufficient volumes in order to establish a true price.  
As uncertainty prevailed financial institutions became unwilling to offer liquidity 
unless the terms were considered well above the risk-free rate. (Fender et al. 
2008:1) Following the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brother a growing 
sense of crisis spread across the globe. The investment bank which had incurred 
huge losses on sub-prime and other lower-rated mortgage backed securities 
declared bankruptcy after financial authorities refused to intervene. The demise of 
the fourth biggest U.S. investment bank reinforced the already foreboding 
atmosphere in financial markets. (BBC News 20.09.2008)  
In the wake of mid-September global financial markets had seized up 
completely and entered a new deeper state of crisis. The situation deteriorated 
further as cost and availability of credit, household budgets, mortgages, pensions, 
corporate financing became severely affected. With credit and money markets 
essentially frozen and equity prices plummeting, banks and other financial 
institutions saw their access to funding eroded and their capital base shrink. 
(Mizen 2008:532) 
To avoid a collapse of the international financial system governments all across 
the world adopted unprecedented measures to arrest the threatening development. 
As the threat to economic stability was closely related to the problems in the 
financial sector, policy responses were predominantly focused on banks and 
financial institutions and markets and the flow of credit to households and 
businesses. A variety of measures were taken in quick succession to counter 
threats to the stability of individual financial and banking institutions. Despite 
dramatic actions adopted by national authorities the situation deteriorated further 
and it soon became clear that a concerted European response to economic and 
financial crisis were inevitable. (Fender et al 2008:13) 
In the beginning of October, the euro group adopted a concerted rescue plan to 
arrest the threatening development. The European Action Plan confirmed the 
commitment of the euro area countries to act together in a decisive and 
comprehensive manner in order to restore confidence and proper functioning of 
the financial system. The aim of the rescue effort was to restore appropriate and 
efficient financing conditions for the economy. (EC 13.10.2008) 
By mid-October, while markets continued to struggle with the uncertainties 
surrounding the large number of newly announced policy initiative, reports on 
economic activity confirmed that numerous major economies had officially 
moved into recession. Thus, while the combined efforts by European governments 
appeared to have arrested the international credit crisis, global recession fears 
came into focus. (Fender et al 2008:20) 
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In December the European Council approved a European Economic Recovery 
Plan to combat the economic contraction. The comprehensive rescue effort was 
equivalent to about 1.5 percent of the GDP of the European Union. The plan 
provided a common framework to ensure the consistency and effectiveness of the 
common rescue effort.(EC 17271/08) 
This unprecedented wave of measures taken by the European Council, and the 
European Commission was perceived as a decisive response to the economic and 
financial crisis. During the course of the crisis European leaders frequently uttered 
assertive statements to justify the adoption of swift, forceful, and decisive 
measures to arrest the threatening development. (EC 17271/08) However, one 
question remains, how did Heads of State and Government, and the European 
Commission go about to implement these measures?        
 
 
1.1 The aim of this study 
 
The main objective of this study is to assess the European response to the 
economic and financial crisis by employing a concept of securitization. In order to 
realise this objective the analytical aim of this study is twofold. The primary aim 
of this study is to improve our understanding concerning to what extent the 
international economic and financial crisis was perceived as a security threat by 
European leaders. This is accomplished by specific assessment of EU 
policymaking during the crisis. The analysis is focused on one specific episode 
that begins with the adoption of the European Action Plan1 by the euro group, to 
the adoption of the Economic Recovery Plan2 by the European Council.  This aim 
is essential to this security study and may thus be re-formulated into following 
research question: 
  
1. To what extent is the international economic and financial crisis 
perceived as a “security threat” by European leaders? 
 
The purpose of this research question is to assess the perception of the crisis by 
employing a concept of securitisation. The object of reference; “European 
leaders”, refers to the European Union and European Council members. Hence, 
the question does not include how the crisis is perceived by national authorities, 
and other non-EU actors. In answering this question, the study employs a theory 
of securitisation. The theoretical framework is based on the works of the 
Copenhagen school although adapted to a European context. “Traditionally but 
not necessarily, the state incorporating the government, territory, and society is 
perceived as the main referent object in security studies.” (Buzan, Waever & de 
Wilde 1998:21) This study seeks to expand this state-centrist perspective of the 
referent object and include the European Union. The main purpose of this 
                                                             
1 Paris, 12th October 2008 
2 Brussels, 12th December 2008 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adaption is to conceptualise financial and economic authorities within a European 
context.  Thus, my analytical aim is to carry out an assessment of the concerted 
European response of the economic and financial crisis in order to understand if 
and how the “security threat” is constructed.    
The secondary aim of this study is to provide a constructivist perspective on 
how we can explain the particular measures taken by the European Union and 
European Council members to address the economic and financial crisis. The 
European Union has adopted numerous measures to arrest the financial crisis and 
combat the recession. These efforts are perceived to be particular, unconventional 
and thus above everyday politics. In other words, the secondary aim of this study 
is to provide a constructivist assessment on the materialisation of the concerted 
European response to the economic and financial crisis. The second purpose may 
be re-formulated into following research question:  
 
2. How can we explain, by employing a concept of securitisation, the 
extraordinary measures taken by the European Union to address the 
crisis?  
 
The theoretical framework used in this study is based on the works of the 
Copenhagen School on security analysis. Thus, the aim of the research question is 
to assess measures taken by the European Union to address the economic and 
financial crisis by employing a theory on securitisation. The study approaches this 
aim through two subsidiary research questions.   
 
a) How do European leaders justify the adoption of “extraordinary 
measures” to tackle the crisis?   
 
The first subsidiary question refers to how policymakers justify measures to 
address the crisis.  In answering this question, the study analyses utterances by 
European Council members and the European Commission. These utterances 
include official documents and verbal statements. The language used by 
policymakers implies how they justify certain measures to the wider public. 
   
b) What can we extract, by employing a concept of securitisation, from 
the language used by European leaders regarding the implementation 
of the rescue efforts? 
 
The second subsidiary question also refers to the language used by European 
Council members and the European Commission. By applying a security 
perspective the question seeks to determine what can be extracted from the 
language. Subsequently, the question includes a theoretical discussion on the 
relevance and the essences of the utterances.      
Finally, this study aims to make a contribution to the understanding of EU 
policymaking during the economic and financial crisis. It seeks narrow the gap 
between the theory on security analysis and European policymaking. This study 
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will not completely bridge the gap between security studies and policy, but it aims 
to bring the two closer together. 
 
 
 
1.2 The collapse of the international credit market  
 
To be able to comprehend the context of the Concerted European Response by the 
Heads of State and Government, and the European Commission we have to 
consider the background to the international economic and financial crisis. Hence, 
this chapter will review the events associated with the credit market disruption 
that began in August 2007 and developed into a full-blown crisis in the fall of 
2008.   
This section will begin to assess the systemic deficiencies that led to the 
disruption in credit markets. This will be followed by a description of the wave of 
intervention by national financial authorities. This chapter will be concluded with 
a brief overview of the causes associated with the economic and financial crisis.   
 
 
1.2.1 Asset securitisation  
 
In 1981, the government-sponsored U.S. mortgage agency Fannie Mae began 
issuing mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and soon after new private 
securitised products emerged without the backing of the U.S. government. In 
Europe securitisation of assets emerged during the 1990s and picked up 
considerably in 2004. Asset securitisation within Europe mainly occurred in the 
Netherlands, Spain and Italy, but they were widely sold outside the euro area. 
(Mizen 2008:536)   
Securitisation was undertaken by commercial and investment banks through 
“special purpose vehicles” (SPVs). These financial entities were created to enable 
them to engage in investment activities using assets conferred on them by banks. 
The most important characteristics of SPVs are that they are not under direct 
control of the banks as they form a separated legal entity. The advantage with this 
financial set up is that SPVs allow banks to make use of assets for investments 
purposes without incurring risks of bankruptcy to the parent organisation. (Mizen 
2008:537) 
By transferring asset-backed securities to SPVs, the bank is able to separate 
them into pools and sell them to investors. This process is generally called asset 
securitisation. The purpose of asset securitisation is to spread risk among a large 
number of investors. Each security will represent only a fraction of the total value 
of the diverse pool. By bundling the underlying assets into different pools, 
securities may be sold to investors with specific needs. In the event of default the 
products with the highest risk rating would be the first to incur losses. The 
products which have the lowest risk rating is labelled equivalent to government 
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debt. However, this development created greater default risk for the mortgages 
and heterogeneity in risk rating. (Mizen 2008:537-538) 
By repackaging these pools several times banks were able to include risky 
assets such as sub-prime mortgages and label the new product as low risk. These 
new securities were perceived as secure investments and thus bought by banks, 
insurance companies, asset managers, and hedge funds to improve risk 
management. After a few years a large number of financial institutions were 
exposed to these risky investments.3(Mizen 2008:537)   
The complexity of the new products, issued by the private sector, created a 
situation where the link between the default risk and the movement of house 
prices was not fully appreciated by investors. In search for higher yields banks 
issued an increasing amount of loans, and repackaged them as low risk products, 
and sold them to unsuspecting investors. For this reason, the development in the 
securitised mortgage market is referred to as the source of the international 
financial crisis. (Mizen 2008:538-539) 
 
 
1.2.2 Sub-prime mortgages 
 
The term sub-prime refers to borrowers who are perceived as riskier than the 
average borrower because of poor credit history.   (Gorton 2009:12) Subprime 
lending enable financial institutions to provide credit to borrowers that don’t meet 
prime underwriting guidelines. This generally includes an increased risk that the 
borrower may default on their credit. There are several defining features that 
characterise Subprime mortgages. First of all, both the bower and the lender 
benefit from house price appreciation over a short period of time. The time period 
is kept short to protect the lender’s exposure. Depending on appreciation of house 
prices the mortgages can be rolled into another mortgage. In other words 
beneficial appreciation of the house price enables refinancing every two or three 
years. (Gorton 2009:13) 
Secondly, the Subprime mortgage includes sizable prepayment penalties. The 
size of the prepayment penalty creates an incentive not to refinance too early. 
(Gorton 2009:13) Subprime mortgages are usually referred to as “hybrids” 
because they incorporate both fixed- and adjustable- interest rates. The initial 
monthly payment is based upon a “teaser” interest rate that is generally fixed to 
the first three years. After the initial period comes the interest rate “reset” and the 
interest rate becomes floating. The “reset interest rate” is significantly higher than 
the fixed rate but potentially affordable to the borrower. (Gorton 2009:16) 
If the interest rate and the prepayment penalty are sufficiently high the 
borrower is likely to default without refinancing the mortgage. In other words it is 
the lender that makes the choice to refinance.  The refinancing option is essential 
to the lender as it enables them to speculate on price development. If the 
                                                             
3 The global market for these asset‐backed securities was estimated by the Bank of England at $ 10.7 
trillion in 2006. 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probability of a house price increase is sufficiently high the lender may perceive 
refinancing as profitable. Refinancing doesn’t necessarily mean that the borrower 
receives a long-term mortgage. It’s more likely that the borrower receive a 
sequence of subprime mortgages as house prices increase. However, in such a 
sequence, the lender has the right to opt out by not refinancing the mortgage and 
taking the recovery amount, leaving the borrower bankrupt. (Gorton 2009:16-17)        
Sub-prime mortgages proved to be successful, at least for a significant period 
of time. From 2000-2007, the amount agency mortgage doubled, while subprime 
grew 800 percent. By 2006 issuance of Subprime constituted about 30 percent4 of 
the U.S. home mortgage market. (Gorton 2009:12) However, when house prices 
started to decline borrowers could not meet their financial obligations and 
creditors all over the globe became exposed to a wave of defaults. 
 
 
1.2.3 The housing bubble  
 
Private homeownership has been a long-standing priority among U.S. 
administrations since the great depression. However, in the 1970s U.S. policy-
makers started to promote home ownership among low income and minority 
households. To meet this challenge, politicians encouraged banks to take greater 
risks in order to give these groups access to the loan market. This became 
particularly clear during the Carter administration as the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 was adopted to promote homeownership among 
minority and low income households. However, the enactment did not prompt a 
rapid acceleration in private homeownership until the beginning of the 1990s. 
(The Economist October 16th 2008)   
Between 1993 and 2004 US homeownership rouse from 64 percent to 67 
percent. Both democratic and the republican administrations saw this development 
as something beneficial to the general public. (US Census Bureau 2009) While the 
left claimed it would ultimately reduce social exclusion and promote social 
equality, the right saw this as a way to realise their long-standing goal of “owner 
democracy”. However, the rapid growth in homeownership generated an increase 
in property prices, making loans even less affordable to low-income households. 
(The Economist October 16th 2008)  
The housing market was fuelled by inexpensive mortgages guaranteed by the 
two government-sponsored mortgage agencies, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The 
two agencies formed the backbone of the U.S. loan market as they issued 
guarantees for outstanding housing loans. Freddie and Fannie even guaranteed the 
lender interest and repayment if the borrower would default. This insurance was 
financed by lucrative fees paid ultimately by the borrower. As the government 
guaranteed that lenders would get their investment back, the risk was transferred 
from banks to the taxpayers. As a consequence this system promoted even lower 
lending standards. (The Economist October 16th 2008)     
                                                             
4 $600 billion 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By pushing market interest rates down and encouraging banks to lend more 
freely, the number of households with access to the loan market increased 
dramatically. These new loans were offered to borrowers with insufficient funds 
for down payment, poor credit history, no income, and incorrect information 
regarding their personal finance. The adherent risk with offering these kinds of 
loans is clearly that borrowers may default on their credit. (Gorton 2009:12)   
When housing prices started to decline in 2006, house values dropped below the 
size of the mortgage for low-income families. This meant that borrowers had a 
good reason to default on their mortgage in order to escape negative equity5. The 
increasing number of foreclosures intensified house-price falls by adding to the 
stock of unsold houses. (The Economist Oct 23rd 2008) 
 
 
1.2.4 Governments intervene  
 
The British bank Northern Rock had adopted a business model that relied heavily 
on wholesale funding and securitisation of its mortgages. The business model 
required regular access to both capital and money markets in order to fund the 
bank’s activities. Thus, it could not endure a long freeze in money markets. 
(Mizen 2008:548) In 2007 funding problems finally emerged as the international 
credit squeeze became evident. As customers started to withdraw their deposits 
Britain witnessed its first significant bank run since the 19th century. The Bank of 
England and the U.K. government considered three options to address the 
problem. The first option was to let the market resolve the liquidity problem, the 
second was to find a suitable bank who was willing to buy Northern Rock, the 
final option was to rescue the bank using public money.  Initially, attempts were 
made to rescue the bank without the use of public money, but when all efforts to 
find a liquid buyer failed the government had to intervene. In September the bank 
was brought into public ownership at a cost of £25 billion in loans and other 
guarantees. (BBC News 22.02.2008) The unusual response by the U.K. 
government was perceived as an attempt to limit the damage of the credit crunch. 
However, Northern Rock was not the only financial institution to suffer from the 
financial crisis.  
In March 2008 it became clear that U.S. investment bank Bear Sterns would 
not be able to meet its financial obligations. The bank which had pioneered in 
securitisation and asset backed securities markets had invested heavily in 
structured finance products. As Goldman Sachs provided recommendations that 
hedge funds should not take exposure to Bear Sterns, investors abandoned the 
ailing bank, reducing the bank’s ability to finance its activities. To avoid 
bankruptcy of the critically important bank, the Federal Reserve revealed that a 
takeover would be necessary. The U.S. government soon arranged a takeover 
through a shares purchase by JP Morgan Chase. The Federal Reserve provided a 
                                                             
5  According  to  U.S.  law  the  lender  is  only  entitled  to  reclaim  property  associated  with  the 
outstanding mortgage. 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$29 billion loan to secure the takeover.  The actions to avert a financial crisis were 
thought to be successful but the magnitude of the credit crunch had just been 
revealed. (Mizen 2008:549) 
In July 2008 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae received support from the U.S. 
treasury after failing to raise new funds through auction. Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae held MBSs that they had issued in their own name or bought to encourage 
loans to low-income households. Many of these loans were sub-prime mortgages 
and when house prices dropped defaults increased dramatically. The problem was 
further compounded considering that many pension funds, money market funds 
and banks held Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae debt securities and used them as 
collateral. In order to avoid setting off a wave of bank failures the U.S. 
government placed the two government-sponsored mortgage agencies under 
conservatorship6. The rescue effort was one of the most sweeping government 
interventions in private financial markets in decades. (Washington Post 
07.09.2008)   
With growing sense of crisis in U.S. financial markets woes spread across the 
globe. In September 2008 Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy after huge losses 
accrued in sub-prime and other lower-rated MBSs. The demise of the fourth 
biggest investment bank prompted the largest U.S. bankruptcy in history. (BBC 
News 20.09.2008)  
As U.S. policy makers and bankers pondered the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
a new threat emerged. American International Group (AIG), the world’s largest 
insurance firm announced that they suffered a liquidity crisis following the 
downgrade of its credit rating. The insurance company had incurred sever losses 
after exposure to credit derivatives7. The business plan was originally intended to 
diminish risk, but with increasing mortgage defaults auditors raised questions 
about how the firm valued its holdings. (The New York Times 27.09.2008) By 
September AIGs credit rating was downgraded and the U.S. government was 
forced to intervene to resolve the liquidity crisis. As a bankruptcy of the insurance 
company was perceived as a critical threat to the international financial system the 
U.S. government provided a rescue package, comprising $153 billion in capital 
injections and loan facilities.8 (Economist 13.11.2008) 
 
 
1.2.5 Quo vadis? 
 
A number of factors provided conducive conditions for an economic and financial 
crisis. First of all, financial innovations such as MBS introduced greater 
complexity, higher yields, and weaker underlying assets. This allowed financial 
institutions to issue an increasing amount of loans, and repackage them as low risk 
products, and sell them to unsuspecting investors. (Mizen 2008:564) 
                                                             
6 A legal status similar to “Chapter 11” (bankruptcy protection). 
7 Derivates is a financial instrument that insures debt holders against defaults.  
8 The AIG rescue package was the largest bail‐out of any form during the international credit crisis 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Second, sub-prime mortgages were introduced to enable financial institutions 
to provide credit to borrowers that did not meet prime underwriting guidelines. 
MBSs based on sub-prime mortgages were perceived as secure investments and 
thus bought by banks, insurance companies, asset managers, and hedge funds to 
improve risk management. However, this created a situation where the link 
between the default risk and the movement of house prices was not fully 
appreciated by investors. (Mizen 2008:564) 
Third, no one anticipated that house prices would drop in the United States - 
this was not built into the models designed to assess risk. When house prices did 
fall, and defaults increased in the sub-prime sector, investors reappraised the risks 
associated with these high-yielding residential MBSs. Thus, the rapid decline in 
residential prices was followed by a liquidity crisis. Soon, financial institutions 
across the globe started to collapse due to the freeze in money markets. (Mizen 
2008:564)   
The failure of a number of financial institutions spurred a reaction in the 
financial markets and banks of all kinds withdrew from lending in money 
markets. Financial authorities in both Europe and the U.S. decided to act to 
provide liquidity to the markets and funding for financial institutions of critical 
importance. By late September 2008 it became clear that these efforts were not 
enough to avoid a systemic collapse of the international financial system. (Mizen 
2008:564)   
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2 Research methodology 
 
I will now address methodological questions related to both the theoretical 
framework and the empirical analysis. The following section will bring forth a 
consecutive presentation of the methodological background of security studies. 
Thus, this section begins with a brief discussion on the constructivist approach 
employed in this study. The constructivist approach will be followed by a 
presentation of methodological considerations regarding the course of action, the 
ontology of the referent objects, and the empirical material. The methodological 
discussion will provide both a logical basis for the theoretical approach and serve 
to facilitate a relevant empirical analysis.  
 
 
2.1 Constructivist epistemology 
 
The general discourse within social science could be described as an elusive 
debate concerning the definition and essence of social facts. Traditionally the field 
of thought could be categorised as a polemic between two influential theoretical 
camps; realism and idealism. Realists accept the existence of social facts, which 
means that the primary objective of the research is to test assumptions that are 
“indisputably” proven by the empirical evidence. This implies that objectivism is 
the defining methodological element of realism. Idealists however deny the very 
existence of an objective reality as they perceive subjectivity as a crucial source 
for generating knowledge. (Tassinari 2004:83)  
Constructivism rejects the dialectic discourse characterizing the traditional 
field of thought. Instead constructivism perceive “the manner in which the 
material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on 
dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world”. (Adler 
1997:323) Hence, constructivism maintains a middle ground by emphasizing the 
ontological reality of inter-subjective knowledge and methodological and 
epistemological implications of this reality. Constructivists underlines that the 
study of International Relations is primarily based on social facts. These facts 
should be perceived as the outcome of human agreement.  (Adler 1997:323) 
Constructivism, unlike realism and idealism, does not make any effort to 
develop or formulate a political theory. It should rather be seen as a social theory 
on which constructivist theories of international relations are based. In Seizing the 
Middle Ground, Emanuel Adler presents a complex conceptualisation of the 
theoretical relationship between realism, idealism and constructivism. 
“Constructivism challenges only the ontological and epistemological foundations 
of realism and idealism. It is not anti-liberal or anti-realist by ideological 
conviction; neither is it pessimistic or optimistic by design” (Adler 1997: 323). 
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Consequently, constructivism can be seen as an effort to generate a synthetic 
theory that emerges from the middle ground between relativism and absolutism.  
Constructivism scrutinizes social facts according to how they are displayed in 
reality. This assumption has lead to criticism regarding the theory being 
insufficient for making predictions. If deliberation is achieved through 
observation of events, then deliberation is only possible regarding social facts that 
have already occurred. Social facts that have yet to occur could hardly be 
predicted using constructivism. In other words, “constructivism is better at 
describing the past than anticipating the future”. (Tassinari 2004:83) However, 
constructionists argue that the theory indeed enables prediction of the future. The 
construction of social reality is in fact subject to a continuous process of learning. 
This means that the origin of social facts, their unfolding and their possible future 
developments are sequentially connected. This assumption is generally referred to 
as cognitive evolution.   (Tassinari 2004:83) Cognitive evolution, according to 
Adler, means that “at any point in time and place of historical process, 
institutional or social facts may be socially constructed by collective 
understandings of the physical and the social world that are subject to 
authoritative (political) selection processes and thus to evolutionary change”. 
Adler argues that cognitive evolution should thus be perceived as a process of 
innovation that creates the inter-subjective understanding on which the behaviour 
of governments is based. (Adler 1997:339)  This enables constructivism to explain 
change and indicate possible scenarios for the future on the basis of earlier 
experience. In other words, the analyst ability to predict the future depends on 
what has happened in the past. (Tassinari 2004:84)  
As this study involves financial authorities’ historical behaviour, it makes no 
assumption about future developments. Albeit, it’s important to underline that the 
validity of the study rests on the constructivist assumption about cognitive 
evolution. The basis of the analysis is determined by the audience acceptance of 
future scenarios in form of threat uttered by the securitizing actor. The success of 
the speech act is determined by inter-subjective understanding of reality. Hence, 
constructivism constitutes the methodological basis for this study.      
     
 
2.2 Methods and Sources 
 
In order to analyse the economic crisis through a security perspective we first 
need to establish a methodological course of action. There are several 
considerations we have to address in order to apply a relevant course of action in a 
security study.  Proponents of the Copenhagen School argue that security analysis 
entails three essential methodological elements. 
 
1. Referent object  
2. Method  
3. Material and sources   
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2.2.1 Referent object 
 
The general discourse in social sciences is based upon a division of disciplines.  
This practice reflects a general understanding that the economy, politics, and 
society are somehow different.  The practice of separating the field of research is 
usually not explicit but the researcher acknowledges that the particular activity in 
every sector is analytically significant. As this thesis will focus on a wider agenda 
we need to consider what sectors are relevant. (Buzan et al 1998:7)  
The purpose of using sectors is to identify items that share a context or 
distinctive pattern of interaction. In social sciences items are usually dependent on 
a context and lack the quality of independent existence. Sectors may be identified 
as a distinctive context but they will in fact remain inseparable parts of a complex 
whole. Thus, it’s important to underline that the purpose of selecting the sector is 
simply based on reducing the complexity in order to facilitate a relevant analysis. 
In essence, sectors reduce the number of variables in play and demarcate the 
scope of the research question to more manageable proportions. (Buzan et al 
1998:7-8) 
The complex nature of the economic and financial crisis makes it difficult to 
identify the relevant sector. Traditionally security analysis adopts a realist 
perspective of security issues. Generally political security concerns organisational 
stability of states, system of governance and the ideology that offers them 
legitimacy. Economic security concerns the access to resources, markets and 
finance necessary in order to sustain welfare and state power. (Buzan et al 1998:7-
8) However, in order to analyse the financial crisis through a security perspective 
it is important to move away from central placement of the state as the main 
object of referral in all sectors. Thus, in this study, the role of the state should not 
be regarded as absolute or exclusive. Many different types of actors may in fact 
play a significant role in the process of securitisation. To be able to identify these 
actors we need to approach the ontology of security.     
Security should be perceived as a social construction that communicates the 
state of a particular situation. If the audience accepts a security claim as social fact 
we may have successful securitisation. Hence, the very conception social fact is 
highly relevant in the process of identifying referent objects. In “Genesis and the 
development of scientific facts” Ludwig Fleck introduces a unique set of tools to 
conceive the production and circulation of social facts. Fleck argues that the 
conceptual creation of social facts is the outcome of a complex process of social 
consolidation. These thought products are never finalised as they may undergo 
transformation through intra-collective or even inter-collective interaction. 
(Rochel de Camargo 2002:829)     
Fleck introduces two important epistemological concepts: the “thought 
collective” and “thought style”. He describes the thought collective as “a 
community of persons mutually exchanging ideas of maintaining intellectual 
interaction” (Fleck 1979:39), and thought style as “a definite constraint on 
thought” (Fleck 1979:64). Within the thought collective, Fleck identifies two 
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different communities. The esoteric community comprised by experts producing 
social facts, and the exoteric community which is comprised by the wider society, 
interpreting and accepting social facts. (Fleck 1979:13) 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fleck argues that social facts are transformed through the mutual interaction 
between the esoteric community and the exoteric community. (Fleck 1979:40) 
Thought should therefore not be perceived as a constant or an objective process. 
Social fact within a thought community is itself conditioned by social structures, 
and follows a path that establish the terms on which actors proceed. (Erickson 
2005:140) In this remark threats should be seen as a product of a thought process. 
Thus, in a security context, the social structure of a thought community 
establishes the rules of the game as well as who has the authority to make 
decisions.  
In this study the esoteric community is comprised by Governments, 
Parliaments, European Commission and other financial authorities. Within the 
esoteric community these actors are perceived as legitimate to make security 
claims. However, security claims or social facts are conditioned by the social 
structure within the thought community. Governments, in general, are perceived 
to hold a dominant position within the esoteric community. As they are also 
perceived as the accepted voice of security within the exoteric community they 
constitute the main referent object in this study.  
Within the esoteric community we can also identify non-state actors such as the 
European Commission, OECD, IMF, and the World Bank. These, actors although 
essentially different, play a significant role in the production of security within the 
esoteric community. However, the crucial difference between these institutions 
concerns how their position is perceived by the exoteric community. The wider 
public may not perceive financial institutions, such as IMF or the World Bank, to 
have any real authority when it comes to security matters. However, concerning 
the European Union and especially the European Commission, the situation 
appears to be different. The state-like features of the Union has created a situation 
where governments are challenged by the European Commission as the dominant 
voice of economic security within the Community. This development could be 
explained by the political role and the judicial authority of the Commission. 
Traditionally, the European Commission has been perceived as the legitimate 
voice of the Union. The Commission was set up to act as independent 
supranational authority that would represent the interests of the Union rather than 
the Member States. The Commission is generally regarded as the driving force 
Exoteric Community 
The Audience, 
Stakeholders, 
The Wider Society 
 
. 
Esoteric Community 
Governments, 
European Commission, 
Other financial authorities. 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behind the fundamental restructuring of the prevailing economic order in Europe. 
The most distinguishing example of this development is the creation of the Single 
European Market which was launched after an initiative by the Commission.9 
(Stubbs & Underhill 2006:309)   
The creation of the European Single Market and the introduction of the Single 
Currency have transferred competence from Member States to the Union. The 
transferral of power indicates that Member States accept the Commission as a 
legitimate actor in certain matters, notably regarding areas such as finance and 
economy. The commission has encouraged this development and acted as a policy 
activist to further the interests of the Union. Albeit, the Commission in many 
ways is perceived by the esoteric community as a dominant voice of security in 
economic matters, the exoteric community has an ambiguous perception of its 
authority. The wider audience perceive the government, rather than the 
Commission, as the dominant voice of security. The Commission is thus a 
subordinated actor within the exoteric community. However, as the Commission 
clearly constitutes a political and financial authority within the esoteric 
community it should be regarded as a referent object in this study.   
 
 
2.2.2 Method 
 
Discourse, in general, refers to the actual practise of communicating in speech or 
writing. However, in a methodological context the use of the term is somewhat 
more specific as it refers to “interrelated set of texts, and the practise of 
production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being”. 
(Phillips et al. 2002:3). This means that social reality is produced through 
discourse between actors. Consequently, social interaction cannot be fully 
understood without analysing the discourse that gives them meaning.     
Discourses are embodied and enacted in a various forms of texts. Their 
existence goes beyond the scope of the individual text as it holds an intrinsic 
communicative element. Texts could thus be considered a material manifestation 
of discourse. (Phillips et al. 2002:4)   The communicative perception of texts 
suggests that they are not meaningful individually. Instead, it is the 
interconnection with other texts that make them meaningful.  
In 1952 Zelling Harris introduced a method to analyse the interconnection of 
speech and writing. Discourse analysis helps us to understand the process how 
social reality is created, performed and displayed through our language. (Paltridge 
2007:2) This social constructivist approach explores how texts are made 
meaningful and how they contribute in the construction of social reality. (Phillips 
et al. 2002:4) Discourse analysis thus explores the interaction between social 
groups and complex societal structures which is embedded in the discourse. By 
ascertaining the constructive effect through the structured and systematic study of 
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texts discourse analysis constitutes a powerful method for studying social 
phenomena. (Phillips et al. 2002:4-5)          
Securitisation analysts argue that security issues are constructed by the 
dialectic between the securitising actor and the accepting or rejecting audience. 
Security is mediated by a stock of discourse that is characterised by urgency and 
exceptionality. (Neal 2006:3) Hence, the effect of the discourse, both in terms of 
securitisation and the outcome of a security move, (i.e. the speech act, and the 
acceptance of the audience), presuppose the utility of discourse analysis. 
(Tassinari 2004:91) Subsequently, discourse analysis constitutes the main 
methodological instrument in this study. However, in order to analyse the security 
discourse we must first indicate the methodological criterion behind the choice of 
texts.   
The first defining criterion is based on the distinction between hegemonic and 
competing discourses. This concept, originates from the work of Chantal Mouffe 
and Ernesto Laclou, and later adopted by the Copenhagen School. Fabrizio 
Tassinari and Isil Kazan refer to this approach as “intra-discourse analysis”. 
(Tassinari 2004:92, Kazan 2003:112-113). Intra-discourse analysis involves a 
discourse taking place simultaneously at different levels of a society. In this study, 
intra-discourse analysis refers to what is said, and by whom, at the regional and 
the European level, at a certain point during the crisis. Thus, the spatial and 
temporal dimension of the discourse is quintessential to the validity of the 
analysis.    
The second defining criterion concerns the determination of hegemonic and 
competing texts. Hegemonic texts refer to a dominant ideology or an inter-
subjective understanding about social reality, while competing texts refer to those 
that do not support or correspond with the dominant ideology. However, it is 
important to emphasize that the categorisation will not depend on the normative 
assumption regarding the ideological position of the text, instead preference will 
be granted on the basis of the audience acceptance of a securitising move. In other 
words, hegemonic and competing texts are defined solely on the basis of the 
successful securitisation.  
The third defining criterion refers to Wæver’s distinction between official and 
debated texts. By distinguishing between official and debated texts the focus 
remains on the intra-discursive dimension, but differentiates between actual and 
competing policies. The two concepts should thus be perceived as complementary 
as it is merely an adaptation to the security context. (Tassinari 2004:91) 
 
2.2.3 Material and Sources 
 
According to proponents of the Copenhagen School, “security experts usually 
draw upon a varied repertoire of sources, newspapers, conversations, theories 
and other academic writings on the case, which all come together in their skilful 
judgment” (Buzan et al. 1998: 178).  
In the light of the Copenhagen School, the subsequent primary source 
employed in this study includes official documents, selected speeches and 
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statements from major policy makers. This category is also comprised by policy 
documents from governments and the commission. Both types of texts should be 
considered dominant/hegemonic, as they derive from actors that the audience 
perceive as financial authorities. A politician or a senior official, from either the 
European Commission or a Member State that publicly express a judgement 
regarding the security situation within the EU, provides an indication of the terms 
by which the political establishment in the EU perceives the threat. (Tassinari 
2004:91) However, there are certain limits to the analysis of speeches and public 
statements mainly concerning the sequential order in which past events occurred, 
and inescapable technical limitations. Concerning the former limitation, I have 
acknowledged the temporal aspects of speeches and statements by policy makers. 
As the crisis developed rather swiftly during the course of the autumn these 
sources is analysed within the scope of its chronological occurrence. The second 
limitation is more challenging as it concerns the linguistic heterogeneity of the 
discourse. The number of languages limits the degree of comparability of different 
speeches and statements. However, as the primary sources in this study have been 
translated by professional interpreters, the content and the inclination is preserved. 
Additionally, every utterance has been compared to other sources in order to 
avoid miss-interpretations.  
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3 Defining security 
In the traditional mode of security analysis, international security refers to how 
human collectives relate to each other in terms of threats and vulnerabilities. The 
dynamic relational nature of security is central as it includes security dilemmas, 
power balances and security regimes. In this article the security refers to a 
traditional military-political understanding of the term. The concept of security 
basically refers to survival. Waever defines security as “when an issue is 
presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object 
(traditionally but not necessarily, the state, incorporating the government, 
territory, and society)”. This form of security threats justifies the use of 
extraordinary measures that would under normal circumstances be considered 
impossible. By invoking security threat the government declares a state of 
emergency, thus claiming the right to take necessary measures to impede a 
threatening development. (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998:21)  
When analysing political discourse and measures it is important to make a 
distinction between a normal process of politicization and the process of 
securitization.  Existential threats are not necessarily based in on what threatens 
individual human lives but the particular character of a certain situation. In other 
words, the definition of what constitutes an existential threat depends on the 
sector and level of analysis. (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998:21-22) 
In the political sector, existential threat traditionally refers to state sovereignty. 
The sovereignty of the state can be threatened by anything that challenges the 
recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority of the state. In this context it is 
important to recognise the increasing interdependence and institutionalisation of 
international relations. This especially concerns the European integration as the 
Union increasingly manifests authority. Events that might undermine the process 
of integration may also be considered as an existential threat. (Buzan, Waever & 
de Wilde 1998:22-23)  
In the economic sector it is important to differentiate between private firms and 
governments. While private firms may be existentially threatened by bankruptcy, 
states are seldom faced with such a situation. However, national economies may 
be threatened by an inability to sustain a welfare state. In a wider security context 
existential threats in the economic sector may undermine rules, norms and 
institutions of the regime.  (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998:22-23)      
 
3.1 Inter-subjective security  
 
Researchers dealing with security analysis have noted that it can be approached 
both objectively and subjectively. However, it’s important to underline the 
respective strengths and weaknesses associated with each approach.   
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An objectivist approach to security analysis may lead to arbitrary or premature 
conclusions, if not the circumstances offers an immediate and explicit threat. As 
such circumstances seldom occur it’s difficult to distinguish real threats from 
“duds”, as it would demand an objective measurement of security. Even if 
security theory would offer such a measurement it is unclear if an objectivist 
approach would be useful. Different states appear to have different disposition 
regarding threats. What some countries perceive as an existential threat may in 
fact be perceived as an ordinary situation in other countries.10 (Buzan et al 
1998:29-31) This is especially evident in the economic sector.  
Security in the economic sector normally involves some form of economic 
threat. The existential threat is generally based on economic data, theories and 
policies. Adopting an objectivist approach would mean that economic analysis 
could predict some undesirable event and thereby avoid or moderate that event 
through economic policy. However, economic policy is usually applied to 
problems after they arise. The economic policy is thus adopted to achieve a more 
desirable situation. It’s important to emphasize that both the existential threat and 
the desirable situation is not determined by a universal set of values but by the 
particular norms and values of the actor and the audience.  Economic data, 
theories and policies do not create the threat nor the desirable situation as it 
merely describes a specific situation.  (Campbell, McConnell & Brue 2005:8-10) 
It is the stakeholders that interpret the information as a threat and enact measure to 
resolve the undesirable situation. For example, economic data, theories and 
policies shows that high inflation rate may lead to a sharp decline in the economy. 
To resolve the undesirable situation the government securities the inflation rate 
and define it as an existential threat to the welfare state. If the audience accept this 
subjective interpretation the securitised move could be determined as successful.  
The distinction between objective and subjective is useful for underlining the 
fact that security is determined by actors, and in this respect is subjective. 
Successful securitisation is determined by the inter-subjective acceptance of the 
audience. In this context, the referent object in securitisation is something that the 
audience perceive as vital and that it should survive. By referring to an object that 
the audience want to save, the securitising actor could legitimise certain measures. 
The audience accepts the security speech act and tolerates or supports measures 
that otherwise would be dismissed. Hence, successful securitisation is not decided 
by the securitising actor but by the inter-subjective acceptance of the audience.  
(Buzan et al 1998:29-31) 
 
3.2 Securitization  
 
One of the most important contributions to the theoretical discourse on 
securitisation has been the works of the Copenhagen School. In “Security - A 
New Framework for Analysis” Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan presents a 
controversial conceptualization of the term securitization. The Copenhagen 
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School defines securitisation as a successful speech act “through which an inter-
subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat 
something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call 
for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan et al 2003: 
491). In other words when the particular character of the argument refers to an 
existential threat, and it achieves a sufficient effect, the securitising actor may 
circumvent rules or procedures. (Buzan et al 1998:25)  If a discourse could link an 
object of referral to an existential threat it doesn’t necessarily mean that it is 
securitisation. However, this could be characterised as a securitising move. Hence, 
the issue could only be considered securitised if and when the audience accept it 
as an existential threat. The comprehensive theory rests on three central aspects: 
 
1) The relationship between the securitising actor and the audience, and 
2) the speech act, and 
3) facilitating conditions that influence the success of the securitising move.  
 
3.2.1 The relationship between securitising actor and the audience 
 
Security refers to public issues that are framed as extraordinary event or as above 
everyday politics. Security moves the issue beyond the conventional scope of 
politics.  Securitisation can thus be seen as a more extreme version of 
politicisation. (Buzan et al 1998:23)  
The distinction between politicisation and securitisation is vital in this context 
as it reveals the core of securitisation. A public issue may be non-political if there 
is no public debate.11 If a public issue is politicised it means that the issue is a part 
of public policy, requires a government decision and some form of resource 
allocation.12 If a public issue is securitised it means that the issue is presented as 
an existential threat that justifies the state to take extraordinary measures, that 
would be considered impossible under normal circumstances. The framing of 
public policy depends on the nature of the object of referral. There is a substantial 
difference between sectors as well as states as the framing may be based on norms 
and values that are historically important. (Buzan et al 1998:23)    
Securitisation of a public issue is not necessarily based on a real existential 
threat but rather if the issue is presented as such a threat.  The state refers to such 
an issue as more relevant than any other issue, and if the state does not address the 
issue properly everything else will be irrelevant. This enables the government to 
legitimise extraordinary measures that go beyond what is seen as conventional in 
a democracy. These measures may include levying taxes, conscription, restricting 
inviolable rights, expropriation or hostile aggression. (Buzan et al 1998:23-24)   
Acceptance is thus crucial for successful securitisation. The audience has to be 
convinced that the threat is real and harmful. However, in a liberal democracy the 
securitising argument may be contested by other actors. Stakeholders may argue 
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that the threat is not existential and that the securitising actor exaggerates the 
potential threat.  But if securitising argument or move gains enough resonance it’s 
possible to legitimise measures that otherwise would not be considered possible. 
(Buzan et al 1998:25)     
Securitisation is not based on breaking conventional rules or solely by referring 
the issue to an existential threat. Securitisation is only fulfilled by referring an 
object as an existential threat that legitimises the breaking of rules. Thus, it’s 
important to underline that the real scale and significance of a threat is not 
relevant in successful securitisation.  A securitising move concerning existential 
threat to the culture may not include a threat to other sectors. The threat may of 
course have implications on other sectors but the audience may in fact only 
acknowledge that the culture is on stake. Thus, successful securitisation is not 
based on scale or significance but on the audience accepting that the threat is 
existential as it would be difficult to assign degrees of importance to referent 
objects and sectors. (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998:26) 
However, in empirical studies it may be difficult to determine which, when or 
why an audience is relevant. Inter-subjectivity implies voluntarily acceptance by 
the audience, as opposed to repression and silence. In a democratic regime, 
securitisation may be seen as necessary to legitimise certain measures, while an 
authoritarian regime may already possess the power to infringe certain rights 
whiteout portraying the issue as an existential threat. At the same time, it may be 
difficult to determine if the audience acceptance in an authoritarian setting is the 
result of repression or silence. This means that it may be difficult to analyse 
authoritarian regimes through Buzan & Wævers conceptualisation of successful 
securitization.  (Stritzel 2007:363) 
 
3.2.2 The Speech act 
 
The defining feature of the Copenhagen School approach to security is that it 
recognises speech act theory as an important element in securitisation. The 
articulation of “security” entails the claim that a valuable referent object is under 
threat. The existential character of the threat legitimates extraordinary measures 
that go beyond the established rules of normal politics. Hence, this put an actor in 
a very strong position to deal with the problem. By uttering security, a securitising 
actor defines an event as extraordinary, and thereby claims a special right to stop 
the threatening development. Security utterance is thus marked by survival, 
urgency and the pre-eminence of action. (Wæver 1995:55)   
Wæver’s conceptualisation of security is based on a realist understanding of 
security. The realist concept of security refers to the idea of national survival. 
Hence, by successfully uttering security the issue is transformed to something 
exceptional. This transformation means that the word security, as a sign of 
referring to something more real, is not interesting. It is the utterance itself that is 
the act. Thus, the mechanism of this transformation is based on John L. Austin’s 
concept of performative utterances’.   
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Austin argues that “the uttering of a sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an 
action”. (Austin 1962:5-7)  The sentence does not describe, verify or report the 
doing of something, but the sentence is the act itself. This means that performative 
utterance falls outside the conventional true or false dichotomy.  Thus, the 
sentence is not dependent on a truth condition but on felicity condition. If this 
condition is met, the speech act may be accepted even despite the fact that it’s not 
true. This means that performative utterance have the potential to create reality. 
(Austin 1962:5-7)  
By applying Austin to security studies the very utterance of security means the 
doing of an action. This moves the focus from whether the threat is actually “true” 
to what happens because of the speech act. For the Copenhagen School this means 
that performative utterance facilitates the audience acceptance of the alleged 
threat, and thus enables the securitizing actor to enact extraordinary measures. In 
other words, the audience tolerates the breaking of conventional rules because of 
performative utterance. (Stritzel 2007:361) 
 
3.2.3 Facilitating conditions  
 
The relationship among actors is not equal or symmetrical. The possibility for 
successful securitisation is rather dependent on the position held by the 
securitising actor. The particular position of the actor determines if the actor could 
be regarded as the accepted voice of security. This means that the actor who holds 
that position may have the power to define security. However, this power is never 
absolute as the position does not guarantee the ability to make people accept a 
security claim. The securitising actor may also be challenged by other actors 
articulating alternative security claims. In other words, no actor holds the 
conclusive power of securitisation. (Buzan et al 1998:31)  
The Copenhagen School acknowledges that in concrete analysis it is important 
to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating security. The 
success of a security utterance is determined by both internal and external 
facilitating conditions. The introduction of these conditions emphasize that both 
power and the inter-subjective establishment of a threat are important to 
understand securitising speech acts. Inspired by Austin they refer to the 
facilitating conditions as:  
 
Internal facilitating conditions: External facilitating conditions: 
 
 
 
 
1. The demand internal to the 
speech act of following the 
grammar of security 
2. The social conditions 
regarding the position of 
authority for the securitizing 
actor — that is, the relationship 
between speaker and audience 
and thereby the likelihood of the 
audience accepting the claims 
made in a securitizing attempt, 
and 
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 3. Features of the alleged threats 
that either facilitate or impede 
securitization. 
(Stritzel 2007:364) 
 
The internal conditions of a successful speech act concerns the form and grammar 
of the utterance. The speech act has to follow the security form, the grammar of 
security, and include a referral to an existential threat. The securitising actor has to 
present the imminent threat as a point of no return and offer deliverance through 
action. The general grammar of security has to be based on the particular dialect 
of the sector (e.g. if the nature of the threat is economic, the securitising actor has 
to adopt a similar language or dialect as the economists). (Buzan et al 1998: 33) 
The external conditions that facilitate a successful speech act concerns the 
social capital and the position of the securitising actor. (Buzan et al 1998: 33) This 
condition does not refer to moral virtue or the general disposition of the actor, but 
to the audience perception of the stature of the securitising actor. Generally this 
includes that the particular position held by the actor is regarded as the accepted 
voice of security. This position should not be confused with an official position 
(e.g. a head of state in a constitutional monarchy may not be seen as a legitimate 
voice if the audience have embraced democratic values).  
The second external condition concerns the threat itself. Securitisation is more 
likely to succeed if the actor refers to objects that are historically or generally 
perceived as threatening (mass-unemployment, bank-panic, weapons of mass 
destruction, hostile sentiments, global warming). The Copenhagen School 
emphasize that objects like this never should be seen as necessary for successful 
securitisation as they merely facilitate the process. (Buzan et al 1998: 33) 
However, it’s difficult to ignore that the Copenhagen School conspicuously 
moves away from an inter-subjective approach, and reveal an implicit inclination 
of objectivism. By accepting that there are objects that are historically or 
generally perceived as threatening, Wæver hints that there may be something else 
mediated through language. Weaver acknowledges this weakness by stating that 
“this part of the theory is highly sensitive because it can lead to a re-introduction 
of objectivism” and “it is necessary to be very precise about the exact status of the 
different elements of the theory”. Although, Wæver seem to be aware of this 
problem he doesn’t offer a way forward. (Stritzel 2007:364) The main focus of the 
security analysis is thus shifted from the inter-subjective acceptance of the speech 
act to the acceptance of objects that are historically or generally perceived as 
threatening. Albeit, it is important to underline that this assumption does not 
automatically lead to the acceptance of an objectivist approach that would enable 
an objective measurement of security. The securitizing actor may in fact refer to a 
normative inter-subjective perception of what may be regarded as existentially 
threatening.  Hence, in order to avoid an objectivist approach to security we now 
have to consider if there are inter-subjective objects that are generally perceived 
as threatening.   
A frame is a persuasive device constructed to “fix meanings, organize 
experience and alert others that their interests and possibly their identity is under 
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threat and propose a solution to the threatening situation”. (Payne 2001:43)  
Frames provide a singular interpretation of a particular situation and put it in a 
broader social or historical context. According to cognitive consistency theory in 
psychology the audience is more likely to accept a claim if they are shown to be 
similar to already accepted ideas. In more general terms, an actor frame issues so 
that the audience can see how well the claim coincide with already accepted ideas. 
(Payne 2001:43)  
In security context the speech act includes a linkage between the threat claim 
and already accepted ideas of threats. If the audience accept that the existential 
threat is similar or resonates with objects that are generally or historically 
perceived as threatening, we may have successful securitisation. The idea of frame 
resonance potentially explains both the success of the security speech act and the 
social function of referring to already accepted ideas. However, objects that are 
generally perceived as threatening are not determined by the securitising actor but 
the inter-subjective perception of the audience. Thus, the audience have to accept 
that the alleged threat is similar to their understanding of general or historical 
threats. (Stritzel 2007:364) 
Individuals evaluate moments in terms of pleasant or awful. As economic 
matters may affect both the individual and the community there is a distinct 
linkage between the two levels. Regarding security analysis, this means that both 
the audience and the securitising actor are affected by significant economic 
events. Hence, the audience and the actor spontaneously evaluate events and 
situations and store them in the form of “likes” (pleasant) and “dislikes” (awful). 
(Kahneman & Tversky 2006:502) E.g. poverty, unemployment and other 
adversities are generally stored as “dislikes”, while winning the national lottery, 
wealth and abundance are generally stored as “likes”. In “Choices, Values and 
Frames”, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky identifies certain criteria’s based 
on empirical research about the process of evaluation. (Kahneman & Tversky 
2000:693)  
The first criteria concern the audience perception of an event in terms of gains 
and losses. “Endowment is valued differently, depending on its relation to the 
original state from which it has been reached.” (Kahneman & Tversky 2000:693) 
In a security context this means that the audience perception of threatening objects 
are generally determined by how much they lost in relation to their original state. 
E.g. the audience evaluation of sharp increase in unemployment is dependent on 
the level of employment before the increase.     
“Global judgements of fictitious episodes or lives are highly sensitive to trends 
of improvement or deterioration and radically incentive to duration.” (Kahneman 
& Tversky 2000:693-694) In a security context this means that the perception of a 
historical threat that is not based on personal experience is highly sensitive to 
trends of improvement or deterioration. E.g. the perception of a failed economy 
may either improve or abate as the audience take part of fictitious accounts. 
Fictitious accounts of previous episodes are generally created by media. However, 
it is important not to neglect those accounts that are transmitted between 
individuals in a more personal setting.      
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“Retrospective evaluations of affective episodes are strongly influenced by the 
affect experienced at singular moments, notably the moment at which affect was 
most extreme and the final moment.” (Kahneman & Tversky 2000:693-694) 
Specific extreme events in a sequence or development may retrospectively affect 
how the audience perceive the threat. E.g. is a region were suddenly struck by 
unemployment it may determine the audience perception of the downturn. The 
audience may in fact exaggerate the scale and impact of the recession due to a 
specific extreme event.       
“Forecasts of the long-term effects of circumstances on subjective happiness tend 
to neglect the likelihood of adaption and therefore exaggerate the long-term 
benefits or costs of life changes.” (Kahneman & Tversky 2000:693-694) The 
audience may exaggerate the impact of a recession if their life situation has 
become worse. On the other hand, if their subjective perception of their individual 
situation has improved they may devalue the effect of the economic turmoil.     
The evaluated outcome of a historical threat is more likely to be made up of a 
college of impressions and affective reactions associated with the most salient 
parts of the experience. (Kahneman & Tversky 2000:694) Thus, successful 
securitisation includes a referral to a previous threat that is determined by a 
college of negative impressions. In other words, if the securitising actor includes a 
referral of a previous threat in to a speech act the audience may accept the 
securitising move.  
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4 The Concerted European Response  
 
The objective of this chapter is to assess the concerted European response to 
the economic and financial turmoil. Official documents, speeches and statements 
issued by leading policy makers are indicative of the defining trend in addressing 
the global and European crisis. Hence, in a security perspective, they constitute 
the most significant sources for analysis and form an essential part of the 
theoretical analysis.  
To facilitate the analytical approach the texts are divided into two distinct 
categories. The first category includes official documents, issued by the European 
Council and ECOFIN, and verbal statements uttered by European leaders. The 
texts will span diachronically in order to observe the evolution of European efforts 
to address the crisis. I also wish to re-emphasize that the purpose of the analysis is 
not to provide an account of the crisis management policy of each Member State. 
The purpose is rather to provide a constructivist assessment of the “security 
threat”, and the materialization of a concerted European response to the economic 
and financial crisis. Hence, the analysis of the texts, regarding the crisis, will 
provide an empirical framework which will facilitate a theoretical security 
analysis of the concerted European response.  
A few more explanatory remarks should also be made to account for the 
manner in which I approach the empirical material. Utterances have been selected 
on the basis of the theoretical framework. These texts may be pertained to the 
linguistic and contextual change between successive points in time. Hence, texts 
employed in this study reflect the materialization of the concerted European 
response from the adoption of the European Action Plan13 by the euro group, to 
the adoption of the Economic Recovery Plan14 by the European Council.    
   
 
4.1 European Action Plan  
 
On 12 October 2008, the euro group adopted a rescue plan for the European 
financial system. The European Action Plan confirmed the commitment of the 
euro area countries to act together in a decisive and comprehensive manner in 
order to restore confidence and proper functioning of the financial system. The 
aim of the rescue effort was to restore appropriate and efficient financing 
conditions for the economy.  The declaration on a “concerted European action 
plan of the Euro area countries” states: (Independent 13.10.2008) 
  
                                                             
13 Paris, 12th October 2008 
14 Brussels, 12th December 2008 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“Millions of depositors have trusted their wealth to our financial 
institutions. The consequences of the current financial market crisis 
jeopardize the crucial economic role of the financial system.” (EC 
13.10.2008) 
 
In the first paragraph of the official document, the euro group establishes that the 
credit crisis is both a financial and an economic threat, as it jeopardizes the 
financial system. By referring to millions of depositors the group moves to expand 
the concept of the financial threat to include the exoteric society. In other words, 
according to the euro group the financial crisis jeopardizes the wider society as 
the economic role of the financial system is threatened.  
 
“Further concerted action is urgently needed given the persistent 
problems of bank financing and the contagion from the financial crisis 
to the real economy.” (EC 13.10.2008) 
 
The euro group continues by stating their commitment to act together in a decisive 
way. Thus, the group declares that the coordination of measures is crucial in order 
to restore confidence and proper functioning of the financial system. The euro 
group presents the financial crisis as an imminent threat, a point of no return, and 
offer deliverance through concerted action.   
 
“We confirm today our commitment to act together in a decisive and 
comprehensive way in order to restore confidence and proper 
functioning of the financial system, aiming at restoring appropriate 
and efficient financing conditions for the economy. In parallel, 
Member States agree to coordinate measures to address the 
consequences of the financial crisis on the real economy, in line with 
7th of October Ecofin conclusions. In particular, we welcome the 
EIB’s decision to mobilise 30 billions € to support European SME’s 
and its commitment to step up its ability to intervene in infrastructure 
projects.” (EC 13.10.2008) 
 
The following paragraph establishes the exceptional circumstances of the crisis, 
and urges the Commission to act quickly and apply flexibility in state aid 
decisions. This article frames the crisis as an extraordinary event and above 
everyday politics. The group emphasizes the independent role of the European 
Commission within the esoteric community, while urging them to continue to 
uphold the principles of the single market.       
 
“In the current exceptional circumstances, we stress the need for the 
Commission to continue to act quickly and apply flexibility in state 
aid decisions, continuing to uphold the principles of the single market 
and of the state aid regime.” (EC 13.10.2008) 
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The euro group underlines, due to the exceptional circumstances of the crisis, the 
importance of coordinated implementation. If Member States would fail to 
coordinate their response, measures taken to avoid escalation of the crisis, will 
create distortions in the banking market. Hence, the importance of swift concerted 
response is once again emphasized in the official document. 
 
“While acting quickly as required by circumstances, we will 
coordinate in providing these guarantees as significant differences in 
national implementation could have a counter-productive effect, 
creating distortions in the global banking markets.” (EC 13.10.2008) 
 
The purpose of the rescue plan is to avoid the failure of relevant financial 
institutions. The wording refers to avoid the collapse of major banks and financial 
institutions that play a critical role in the financial system. Measures stated in this 
paragraph refer to credit guarantees and part-nationalisation of relevant financial 
institutions. Using public money to rescue ailing bank is generally perceived as an 
extraordinary measure within the Community. The failure of financial institutions 
of critical importance is perceived as existential threat within the esoteric society. 
Hence, the official document includes a linkage between threat claim and already 
accepted ideas of a threat among financial authorities.  
 
“Governments remain committed to support the financial system and 
therefore to avoid the failure of relevant financial institutions, through 
appropriate means including recapitalization. In doing so, we will be 
watchful regarding the interest of taxpayers and ensure that existing 
shareholders and management bear the due consequences of the 
intervention. Emergency recapitalisation of a given institution shall be 
followed by an appropriate restructuring plan.” (EC 13.10.2008) 
   
The exceptional circumstances of the financial crisis require constant and 
immediate monitoring of rescue efforts. The exchange of information between 
Member States and the Council and the Commission has to be strengthened in 
order to facilitate an efficient concerted effort. The euro group continue to 
emphasize the exceptional circumstances of the crisis require a degree of 
extraordinary measures to facilitate an efficient concerted response.  
  
“In such circumstances, efficient crisis management requires constant 
and immediate monitoring. We will therefore set up and strengthen 
procedures allowing the exchange of information between our 
Governments, the President of the European Council, the President of 
the European Commission, the President of the European Central 
Bank and the President of the Euro group.” (EC 13.10.2008) 
 
The sweeping rescue plan which moves to guarantee, refloat and partially 
nationalize banks was endorsed by all EU Member States. (Eurostat 20.04.2009) 
The plan frames the financial crisis as a real and significant threat to the financial 
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system and the economy. The threat is imminent and relevant authorities have to 
enact extraordinary measures to avoid the situation to deteriorate. In a statement 
after the meeting in Paris President Nicolas Sarkozy described the concerted 
efforts as:  
 
"a coordinated and ambitious response to the worst financial crisis 
for 80 years.” (Independent 13.10.2008) 
 
The statement by French President should be perceived as a securitizing move as 
he links the economic crisis to the “Great Depression”. In other words, the 
security utterance transforms the issue to something exceptional as it refers to the 
economic turmoil of the 1930s. The reference constitutes a linkage between the 
current situation and an earlier episode that is inter-subjectively held as 
threatening. However, within the thought community, few individuals have 
personal experience of the adversities of the depression. The social function of the 
reference should thus be perceived as a linkage between the current crisis and 
fictitious accounts of the economic turmoil 80 years ago.       
During the summit Premier Gordon Brown commented on the crisis by 
emphasizing the extraordinary situation and the vast consequences decisions taken 
in the near future.     
 
"Important moment for the world economy…decisions that we make in 
the next few days are decisions that will affect us for many years 
ahead." (Independent 13.10.2008) 
 
The UK Premier does not make any reference to previous threats nor does he 
specify the consequences of the ongoing crisis. Instead he emphasizes the 
importance of decisive action. This means that the sentence does not describe, 
verify or report the doing of something, as the sentence is the act itself (the pre-
eminence of action). The issue is thus transformed and moved beyond the 
conventional scope of politics, in order to legitimize extraordinary measures.  
 
 
4.2 A corollary response  
 
During a summit held on 15 and 16 October the European Council confirmed 
their commitment to the rescue plan that was put forward by the euro group to 
meet the international economic and financial crisis. The European Council 
approved to act in a concerted and comprehensive manner to protect the European 
financial system and depositors. (EC 2008:59416) 
 
“Faced with the financial crisis, the European Council affirms that it 
is determined to take coordinated and thorough action to restore the 
smooth running of the financial system, thus ensuring the normal and 
effective financing of the economy and returning to the path towards 
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growth and employment.”(Council of the European Union 
2008:14368) 
 
The European Council affirms that the community is determined to take 
coordinated actions to restore the effective functioning of the economy. The 
Council underlines that in all circumstances the community must enact necessary 
measures to preserve the stability of the financial system. The official document 
goes further than the euro group by stating that Member States should support 
“major” financial institutions from bankruptcies. This means that the exceptional 
situation has to be addressed by extraordinary measures.   
  
“The European Council reaffirms its commitment that in all 
circumstances the necessary measures will be taken to preserve the 
stability of the financial system, to support the major financial 
institutions, to avoid bankruptcies and to protect savers' deposits”. 
(Council of the European Union 2008:14368) 
 
In the following article, the council underlines the importance of swift and 
flexible actions. The Council also confirms the independent role of the 
Commission and recommends them to continue to apply the principles of the 
single market on the system of State aids. The potent and independent role of the 
Commission is particularly emphasized in articles concerning the single market.   
 
“In the current exceptional circumstances, European rules must 
continue to be implemented in a way that meets the need for speedy 
and flexible action. The European Council supports the Commission's 
implementation, in this spirit, of the rules on competition policy, 
particularly State aids, while continuing to apply the principles of the 
single market and the system of State aids.” (Council of the European 
Union 2008:14368) 
 
The Council gives special emphasis on remuneration of company executives. This 
measure is indicative as it refers to government interference in private 
remuneration policy.  By implementing rules that states remuneration should be 
based on actual contribution to the success of the company, Member States aim to 
regulate excessive risk-taking and short-term objectives. Arguably this should be 
considered as an extraordinary measure as it involves extensive government 
interference in the private sector. However, it is difficult to determine if such 
regulations could have been imposed during normal circumstances.      
 
“It emphasises that the real performance of company executives 
should be reflected in their remuneration, including their severance 
pay ("golden parachutes"), which should be in line with their actual 
contribution to the success of the company. Likewise, care should be 
taken to ensure that earnings from stock options or the system of 
remuneration, especially in the financial sector, do not lead to 
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excessive risk-taking or extreme concentration on short-term 
objectives.” (Council of the European Union 2008:14368) 
 
In the last section of the official document the Council calls for a comprehensive 
reform of the international financial system. In order to cope with the international 
economic and financial crisis the Union must work with its international partners. 
The new regime, according to Member States, must be an all-encompassing 
reform based on the principles of transparency, integrity and international 
governance. Hence, the council anonymously declares the necessity to adopt 
exceptional measures to address the crisis.  
 
“The European Union must work with its international partners on a 
genuine, all-encompassing reform of the international financial 
system based on the principles of transparency, sound banking, 
responsibility, integrity and world governance.” (Council of the 
European Union 2008:14368) 
 
Ahead of the Council meeting European Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso appealed to EU leaders respond to the escalating situation.    
 
"to adopt unprecedented European Union action to calm markets and 
prevent a deep recession across the continent.” (EC 2008:59416) 
 
The President of the Commission urges Member State to adopt unprecedented 
actions to prevent a deep recession in Europe. The economic and financial crisis is 
presented by the President as a threat to a valued referent object. As the rescue 
plan refers to restore the functioning of the financial system the referent object 
should be interpreted as the financial system itself. The security utterance is 
clearly a securitising move as it refers the financial crisis as a threat and offers 
relief through unprecedented action by the European Union. This form of security 
threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures that would under normal 
circumstances be considered impossible. By invoking security threat the President 
declares a state of emergency, thus claiming that the Member States have the right 
to take necessary measures to impede a threatening development.    
The French President Nicolas Sarkozy made a similar remark as he announced 
the rescue plan before the parliament.  Sarkozy said: 
 
"Nothing will be spared to prevent the crisis getting any worse" 
(EUObserver.com 14.10.2008)  
 
President Sarkozy states that nothing will be spared to prevent the crisis from 
escalating. The threat justifies the state to take extraordinary measures that would 
be considered impossible under normal circumstances. Thus, the President 
legitimise the adoption of extraordinary measures.   
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During a briefing at the start of the summit UK Premier Gordon Brown 
underlined the importance of reforming the international financial system. Brown 
said:  
 
"As we rebuild our global financial institutions, we also ought to seize 
the opportunity of a trade deal [...] the message must go out that this 
beggar-thy-neighbour approach of the past is of no use," (Irish Times 
16.10.2008) 
 
The British Prime Minister refers to the reform of the global regulatory 
framework of the world’s financial system. At the same time he sends a message 
that protectionism is not the right way.  By uttering the word “rebuild” Brown 
declares a state of emergency. He indicates that global financial institutions are 
severely damaged or destroyed. Thus should the measures proposed by the British 
Prime Minister be perceived as extraordinary and certainly above everyday 
politics. 
After the Council meeting German chancellor Angela Merkel also expressed 
her support for a new economic regime.  
 
"I explicitly support the idea that we should have a meeting this year 
[…] to rethink the world's financial system and prevent any repetition 
of such things". (Irish Times 16.10.2008) 
 
The German chancellor explicitly supports a reform of the world’s financial 
system to prevent any repetition of the financial crisis. She confirms that the 
financial crisis created a situation where governments have to adopt extraordinary 
measures to avoid any repetition of the threatening situation.  Thus, the German 
Chancellor moves to legitimise efforts to reform the global financial regime.  
 
 
4.3 Reforming of the international financial system 
 
Ahead of the international summit on the financial crisis EU leaders met in order 
to pave the way for reform of the international financial system. The heads of Sate 
of government reaffirmed the unity of the Member States as they confront the 
crisis. The official document that was endorsed by all EU leaders states specific 
principles and approaches which could be adopted at the summit of 15 November 
in Washington. (Council of the European Union 07.11.2008) 
 
“The unity of the Heads of State or Government of the European 
Union in coordinating responses to the financial crisis has been a key 
factor for responsiveness and effectiveness.  Now that it is time to step 
up that action and devise long term ways of reforming the 
international financial system, we reaffirm our resolve to work 
together to that end.” (Council of the European Union 07.11.2008) 
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The first paragraph of the official document underlines the importance of a 
coordinated response to the financial crisis. Coordination has been a key factor in 
the European response to the crisis. Thus, the EU leaders seek to step up that 
action and reform the international financial system. This ambitious effort should 
be perceived as an extraordinary measure to address “the core of the problem”.     
  
“The international summit on 15 November 2008 must pave the way 
for reform of the international financial system.  Europe must play a 
major part in it in three respects: common principles upon which to 
build a new international financial system; a working method to 
deliver real decisions swiftly; a full set of responses, some of which 
should be adopted without delay.” (Council of the European Union 
07.11.2008) 
 
The Heads of State or Government reaffirm the importance of the extraordinary 
measures. The new international financial system has to include common 
procedures to deliver decisions. The reaction to the exceptional circumstances of 
the financial crisis has moved the issue beyond the conventional scope of politics. 
Thus, Member States has to be committed to the adoption of extraordinary 
measures including the establishment of a new financial order.   
During the summit President Sarkozy signaled a growing assertiveness by 
Europe in its dealings with Washington and suggested that the U.S. had a special 
obligation:  
 
"This is a global crisis and we have to remember where it started." 
(Financial Times 10.11.2008)  
 
The French government believes that the decision to let Lehman Brothers fail 
aggravated the global crisis. The situation deteriorated as many international 
financial institutions were exposed to Lehman Brothers through investments in 
mutual funds. The French President added:    
 
"The time when we had a single currency [the dollar], one line to be 
followed, that era is over and came to an end on September 18 when 
responsibility was taken, without our opinion being asked, with the 
failure of a major banking institution and the consequences that 
followed." (Financial Times 10.11.2008) 
 
The failure of the investment bank on September 18 marked the end of an era 
dominated by the dollar. President Sarkozy provides a singular interpretation of 
the particular situation and put it in a broader historical context. By framing the 
failure of Lehman Brothers, as the abrupt end of an enduring fiscal regime, he 
moves the financial crisis beyond the normal scope of politics. Thus, by giving the 
issue a broader historical context and underlining the lack of deliberation, the 
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French President seeks to justify the creation of a new financial order based on 
coordination of international efforts rather than national interests.  
While the French President focused on the failure of Lehman brothers, the 
President of the Commission underlined the historical importance of the 
upcoming meeting. 
 
"It has to be a real historic meeting.” (EUobserver 07.11.2008) 
 
President Barroso frames the international gathering in Washington as a historical 
meeting. By underlining that the upcoming event “has to be a real historic 
meeting” the issue is moved beyond the scope of conventional politics. The 
particular character of the utterance refers to the necessity of results in dealing 
with the threatening situation.  Thus, the wording and the particular character of 
the utterance refer to a state of exceptionality.     
 
 
4.4 European Economic Recovery Plan  
 
During a summit on 11 and 12 December 2008 the European Council approved a 
European Economic Recovery Plan, equivalent to about 1.5 percent of the GDP of 
the European Union. The plan provides a common framework for the efforts made 
by Member States and by the European Union, in order to ensure consistency and 
maximising effectiveness of the common rescue effort. (EC 17271/08) 
 
“The economic and financial crisis is a global crisis. That is why the 
European Union is working together with its international partners. 
The Summit held in Washington on 15 November 2008 at the initiative 
of the EU drew up an ambitious programme of work with a view to 
coordinated recovery of the world economy, more effective regulation 
of financial markets, better global governance and the rejection of 
protectionism.” (EC 17271/08) 
 
The first paragraph of the official document confirms that the economic and 
financial crisis should be regarded as a global crisis. Therefore, the Union is 
working together with its international partners to draw up an ambitious 
programme in order to coordinate the recovery of the world economy. The 
initiative also includes improved global governance and the rejection of 
protectionism. This article refers to the implementation of extraordinary measures 
on the international level. By declaring that the financial turmoil is a global crisis, 
the Council justifies measures that go beyond Europe and the conventional scope 
of politics.      
 
“The EU has determined, in a coordinated manner, the emergency 
measures required to restore the smooth operation of the financial 
system and confidence among market players. The European Council 
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stresses the need for Member States to be able to finalise these 
measures without delay.” (EC 17271/08) 
 
The Council underlines that the EU has together adopted emergency measures to 
restore the functioning and the confidence of the financial system. The Council 
stresses the need for Member States to implement the measures without further 
delay in order to cope with the ongoing crisis. By invoking the financial and 
economic threat the Council has declared a state of emergency. In other words, by 
uttering emergency the council refers to the issue as more relevant than any other 
issue. Hence, if Member States does not address the issue properly everything else 
will become irrelevant.     
 
“The financial markets remain fragile. We must remain vigilant and 
continue to implement, as a priority, measures to create greater 
stability, supervision and transparency of the financial sector, 
particularly those envisaged by the ECOFIN Council road map.” (EC 
17271/08) 
 
The heads of state and governments express that the situation remains fragile. 
Thus, the EU has to remain cautious and continue to implement necessary 
measures to address the situation.  The official document states that imminent 
threat of the financial crisis has subside but the implementation of necessary 
measures remains a priority. However, as the Council states that the imminent 
threat of the financial crisis has diminished, they move the focus from the 
financial crisis to the economic downturn. Hence, the threat has not disappeared 
but the object of referral has in fact changed.    
 
“The financial crisis is now impacting on the economy. The euro area, 
and indeed the Union as a whole, are threatened with recession. In 
these exceptional circumstances, Europe will act in a united, strong, 
rapid and decisive manner to avoid a recessionary spiral and sustain 
economic activity and employment. It will mobilise all the instruments 
available to it and act in a concerted manner to maximise the effect of 
the measures taken by the Union and by each Member State.” (EC 
17271/08) 
 
The Council states that systemic impact of the financial crisis has spread to non-
financial sectors. The Union as a whole is currently threatened with recession. 
Thus, the European leaders will act in rapid, concerted and decisive manner to 
avoid a recessionary spiral. EU will mobilise all instruments available to 
maximize the effect of measures taken by the Union and by each Member Sate.  
Evidently the financial sector is no longer the main object of referral. Instead the 
focus has shifted towards non-financial sectors. This development should not be 
perceived as the financial threat has been diverted, but as an indication that the 
language of security reflects the evolution of the crisis.   
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The exceptional circumstances of the financial crisis have created a situation 
where Europe is now threatened with recession. However, the Council moves to 
further emphasize the threat by referring to it as a recessionary spiral. Thus, the 
Council claim, in order to sustain economic activity and employment, EU has to 
adopt extraordinary measures.   
During a press conference after the summit Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
expressed his deep satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting. He said: 
 
“This today, is the answer to those who say just do nothing. This is the 
answer to those who say just let the recession continue and take its 
course. This is the answer to those who say fiscal policy should not be 
used to support monetary policy. This is the answer to those who 
would like to have public spending cuts at this time. This is the answer 
because Europe has agreed that we have a responsibility to our 
peoples. I believe the debate over the last few weeks has ended with 
the conclusion that fiscal policy must, in this substantial way, support 
monetary policy and everybody has agreed and signed up to it.” (BBC 
12.12.2008) 
 
The British Prime Minister comments on the contested utterances made by other 
actors within the esoteric community. The particular character of the Prime 
Ministers utterance signals the perceived legitimacy of the extraordinary measures 
adopted by the European leaders. He declares that the efficient handling of the 
financial crisis is the answer to all those who previously have expressed doubts to 
the rescue efforts. He also states that the agreement among Member States is the 
conclusion of the debate.        
During a plenary session in the European Parliament, the President of the 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso underlined the significance of the 
meeting and the importance of the Parliaments’ approval.    
 
"The balance sheet of the last EU summit will go down in history - 
rarely has Europe been able to express its satisfaction at so many 
positive results […] the European Parliament holds the last key to the 
last door enabling a Europe of the 21st century to start working". 
(European Parliament 16.12.2008) 
 
Barroso describes the EU summit as a historical moment. Europe has been able to 
coordinate the rescue efforts in order to meet the challenges of the financial and 
economic crisis. The president provides a singular interpretation of the rescue 
efforts and put it in a broader social and historical context. The agreement is the 
future as it is a manifestation of European cooperation. Without uttering a threat 
he frames the rescue efforts as the only way forward, as he seeks the approval of 
the Parliament. The Presidents claim resonates with already accepted ideas of 
swift and decisive action. However, it is important to underline that the European 
Parliament is a part of the esoteric society. Thus, the utterance by Barroso should 
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be perceived as seeking the acceptance of a specific segment within esoteric 
community and not the wider public. 
During the plenary session in Strasbourg, President Sarkozy also expressed his 
views on the summit and the financial crisis. The President said:       
 
“If Europe's countries and institutions had not taken responsibility, 
this would have led to the destruction of the European banking system 
[…] our economies and our political cultures are not the same but we 
all agreed in the end". (European Parliament 16.12.2008) 
 
By adopting extraordinary measures the Union and the Member States administer 
the financial crisis and avert the collapse of the European banking system. The 
French President also underlines that differences between Member States did not 
prevent the leaders of Europe to come to an agreement. The blunt remark by the 
president reasserts the validity of the rescue effort. At the same time, the French 
president expresses an assurance to the thought communities that the 
extraordinary measures were indeed necessary to avoid the destruction of the 
banking system. The existential threat to the financial sector was averted by 
concerted efforts in a decisive manner. Hence, the President states, the 
extraordinary measures adopted by EU and the Member States were in fact both 
necessary and effective.  
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5 Analysis  
 
The previous chapter analysed the materialization of a concerted European 
response to the economic and financial crisis. The main lessons learned from this 
case will be discussed thoroughly in this chapter. The main objective of this 
chapter is to assess the European response to the crisis by employing a concept of 
securitization. In order to realize this objective I will first begin to address the 
security threat. The perception of the “security threat” is crucial in security studies 
as successful securitization is dependent on the audience acceptance. Hence, I will 
begin to conduct an assessment of the threat uttered by the securitizing actors. The 
thorough exploration of the security threat will be followed by a theoretical 
assessment of the concerted European response. In order to analyse how the 
extraordinary measures came into being, I will employ a theory of securitization. 
This part will include an assessment of how securitizing actors justify the 
adoption of extraordinary measures. Final conclusions will be presented in the 
following chapter.  
 
 
5.1 The evolution of the security threat  
 
One of the most important elements of the theory of securitisation is the “security 
threat”. In the economic sector the threat is generally based on data, theories and 
policies. It’s important to emphasize that both the existential threats and more 
desirable situations are not determined by a universal set of values but by the 
particular norms and values of the actor and the audience. Thus, the securitising 
actor frames the particular situation as an existential threat. If the audience accepts 
the alleged threat we may have successful securitisation. Hence, the articulation of 
a security threat is a crucial element in securitisation. (Campbell, McConnell & 
Brue 2005:8-10)  
During the autumn the perception of the security threat evolved considerably. 
The evolution reflects both the gradual implementation of measures to address the 
problems in the financial markets, and the general progression of the crisis.  In 
order to understand this evolution it is important to analyse the development of 
the security threat throughout the autumn.  
 
 
5.1.1 The financial crisis 
 
In mid-October the European Action Plan came into being. The rescue plan 
frames the financial crisis as an extraordinary event and above everyday politics. 
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The plan moves the issue beyond scope of normal politics and presents the crisis 
as a threat to the “crucial role of the financial system” (EC 13.10.2008). The 
threat is thus linked to the financial sector rather than directly to the sovereignty 
of the state. However, “the crucial role of the financial sector” also refers to a 
broader and more substantial concept of security. The financial crisis threatens to 
undermine the state, as tax revenues decreases, and resources are transferred to the 
ailing financial system. In such a situation the state may no longer be able to fulfil 
their obligation towards the citizens. Thus, in a wider security context, the crisis 
poses a threat to the welfare state itself.  
The financial turmoil is also presented as an international threat. The particular 
character of the crisis requires a concerted European response to arrest the 
threatening development. (EC 13.10.2008) As concerted action constitutes a 
prerequisite to address the crisis, the concept of security is transformed beyond 
the state. The crisis reflects a process where the financial sovereignty of the state 
has become an integral part of the international financial system. At this point the 
object under threat should thus be perceived as the crucial role of the international 
financial system. The crisis is presented as an existential threat to the international 
finance system. If the Union would fail to implement decisive measures to restore 
confidence in financial markets the crisis may contagion other sectors of the 
economy. The crisis is presented as an imminent threat, a point of no return, 
which can only be avoided by concerted, swift and decisive action (EC 
13.10.2008). In other words, the crisis poses an imminent and existential threat to 
the crucial role of the international financial system.15   
 
 
5.1.2 The economic downturn 
 
During the autumn of 2008 the perception of the security threat evolved. In the 
beginning of December the European Council approved the European Economic 
Recovery Plan which states that the systemic impact of the financial crisis has 
spread to non-financial sectors. (EC 17271/08)  
The Economic Recovery Plan is a clear indication that the security threat has 
evolved. As the Council declares that the imminent threat of the financial crisis 
has diminished, they shift the focus from the financial crisis to the economic 
downturn. Hence, the real economy, instead of the financial sector, becomes the 
main object of reference. At the same time, the Council makes a new security 
claim. The new security threat is not the “financial crisis” but a “recessionary 
spiral” (EC 17271/08).  This threat is framed as significant and potentially 
                                                             
15 “Millions of depositors have trusted their wealth to our financial institutions. The consequence 
of  the  financial market  crisis  jeopardizes  the  crucial  economic  role  of  the  financial  system”  (EC 
17271/08) 
"Nothing will be spared to prevent the crisis getting any worse" (EUObserver.com 14.10.2008) 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harmful as it may have severe implications on economic activity and employment 
in Europe.  
The transition from one threat to another reflects how the crisis developed 
throughout the autumn. At first, European leaders perceived the financial crisis as 
an existential threat to the crucial role of the international financial system. 
However, as the crisis evolved and the real economy became affected the threat 
was redefined as a “recessionary spiral”. In other words, this transition reflects the 
evolution of the crisis from turmoil in the financial markets to en economic 
downturn. Although, it is important to emphasize that the threat is socially 
constructed by the thought producing community. The threat may thus be 
redefined according to the norms and values of the esoteric community. However, 
the success of a securitising move is dependent on the audiences’ acceptance.  
European leader may thus utter security claims but it is the audience acceptance 
that determines if the situation poses a real existential threat.   
 
 
5.2 Securitising the crisis 
 
The previous part of this chapter established that the economic and financial crisis 
was presented as a security threat by European leaders. However, this part will 
assess, by employing a theory of securitisation, measures taken by the European 
Union to address the economic and financial turmoil.  
Securitisation refers to a public issue that is framed as extraordinary event or as 
above everyday politics. Securitisation moves a public issue beyond the 
conventional scope of politics. As European leaders framed the economic and 
financial crisis as an imminent threat and offered deliverance through the adoption 
of extraordinary measures, it should be considered as a securitising move. To be 
able to explain this process and how these measures were adopted by the EU, the 
following part of this chapter will provide a thorough assessment of the 
materialisation of the concerted European response.  
 
 
5.2.1 Articulating the crisis 
 
The speech act constitutes an important element in securitisation. The articulation 
of security entails the claim that a valuable referent object is under threat. The 
existential character of the threat justifies extraordinary measures that go beyond 
the scope of conventional politics. (Wæver 1995:55) During the course of the 
crisis European leaders frequently made remarks stating the imminent need of 
extraordinary measures to stop the threatening development. (EC 17271/08) (EC 
13.10.2008) (EC 2008:59416)  
These remarks by European leaders should be perceived as security utterances 
as they are characterised by urgency and pre-eminence of action. They refer to the 
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adoption of concerted, rapid, and strong measures as the only way to avoid a 
systemic collapse of the economic and financial system. (EC 17271/08) By 
uttering security the European leaders declared a state of emergency. The only 
thing that is relevant during a state of emergency is to address the threat or 
everything else will become irrelevant. Hence, European leaders uttered that the 
particularity of the present justifies the adoption of extraordinary measures to 
evade the threat.  In other words, security utterance informs the wider public of 
the seriousness and the exceptionality of the present. Thus, if the audience shares 
this threatening perception of the present they are more likely to accept the 
security claim. It is although important to emphasize that European leaders may 
have perceived the articulation of security as a necessity as the wider public had 
not yet been affected by the turmoil in the financial markets.16 In other words, the 
general purpose of the frequent usage of security utterances should be perceived 
as a mean to legitimise the adoption of extraordinary measures. 
 
5.2.2 A securitising move 
 
The success of this securitising move is determined by the acceptance of the 
audience of the existential threat. In this context, both the esoteric and the exoteric 
community constitute the audience. While the esoteric community includes 
thought producing actors such as governments, parliaments, academics, civil-
servants and other policy makers, the exoteric community includes the wider 
public. To be able to implement a concerted response, European leaders were 
dependent on the acceptance of the esoteric society. The Council and the 
Commission needed the approval of the both the national and the European 
parliament to implement the extraordinary measures included in the response.17 
Their acceptance was in other words crucial to the success of the securitising 
move. (European Parliament 16.12.2008) However, the wider audience was not 
consulted before the implementation of the concerted European response. The 
exoteric community normally plays an important role in the process of 
securitisation as they may signal their disapproval during referendums and general 
elections. However, as the adoption of the rescue efforts were not preceded by a 
referendum it is difficult to determine whether or not the wider public perceived 
the extraordinary measures justifiable. In other words, the enactment of 
extraordinary measures to arrest the threatening development was accepted by the 
esoteric community, while the exoteric community has not yet been consulted.18  
Furthermore, as the acceptance of the esoteric community was crucial it is 
important to assess why the thought community accept a security claim. There are 
several conditions that facilitate the audience acceptance of a securitising move.  
                                                             
16  However,  it  is  important  to  underline  that  the  wider  public  already  possessed  a  profound 
understanding of the threat as it had been covered by media on a daily basis. 
17 Measures that requires budget allocation.   
18 Surveys may indicate the position of the exoteric society but they are not legally binding to the 
Head of state and governments and the Commission. 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First of all, successful securitisation is dependent on the position held by the 
securitising actor. The particular position of the actor determines if the actor could 
be regarded as the accepted voice of security. However, this power is never 
absolute as the position does not guarantee the ability to make people accept a 
security claim. The securitising actor may be challenged by other actors 
articulating competing security claims. (Buzan et al 1998:31) As the Council 
consists of Heads of State and Government they should be perceived as the 
accepted voice of security in a crisis situation. Hence, the members rather than the 
institution should be regarded as the accepted voice of security. The Commission 
on the other hand is not perceived in the same way. The wider audience perceive 
the government, rather than the Commission, as the dominant voice of security. 
However, as the Commission clearly constitutes a political and financial authority 
within the esoteric community it should also be perceived as an accepted voice of 
security. As the concerted European response materialised, other actors presented 
competing security claims. But these actors were not perceived by the audience as 
legitimate to make security claims. Hence, they failed to stop the adoption of 
European rescue efforts. In other words, the particular position of power held by 
the heads of state and government, and the Commission, should be perceived to 
facilitate successful securitisation.  
Secondly, securitisation is more likely to succeed if the actor refers to objects 
that are historically or generally perceived as threatening. If the audience accept 
that the existential threat is similar or resonates with objects that are generally or 
historically perceived as threatening, they may accept the security claim. (Stritzel 
2007:364) During the autumn European leaders frequently linked the ongoing 
crisis to earlier episodes that is inter-subjectively held as threatening, notably “the 
Great Depression”19. (Independent 13.10.2008) A referral to the adversities of the 
1930s transforms the threat to something exceptional. The reference constitutes a 
linkage between the current situation and an earlier episode that is inter-
subjectively held as threatening. However, within the thought community, few 
individuals have personal experience of the adversities generally associated with 
the depression. Kahneman and Tversky underlines that personal experience of 
singular moments is not necessary to understand previous episodes. A collage 
made up of fictitious accounts of earlier episodes or lives may in fact bring 
sentiment to the perception of a specific event. (Kahneman & Tversky 2000:694) 
Hence, a referral to the economic and financial problems of the 1930s should be 
perceived as a move to provide a linkage between the inter-subjective sentiment 
of the depression and the crisis. By linking the Great Depression to the crisis the 
audience became more likely to accept a securitising move by European leaders. 
Finally, the economic and financial crisis did not necessarily pose a real 
existential threat to the economic and financial system20. However, it was 
presented as such a threat by European leaders. By referring to the crisis as 
something existentially threatening European policy-makers moved to legitimise 
measures that during normal circumstances would have been considered 
                                                             
19 “the worst financial crisis for 80 years” President Nicolas Sarkozy (Independent 13.10.2008) 
20 Many academics and policy‐maker actually perceived the alleged threat as disproportionate to 
the factual circumstances of the crisis. 
   
46 
 
impossible. The Heads of State and Government, and the Commission, thus 
securitised the economic and financial crisis to justify the implementation of 
extraordinary measures to arrest the threatening development.  The success of the 
securitised move was determined by the acceptance of the esoteric community. As 
the rescue plan was adopted by all Member State we may define the actions by the 
European leaders as partially successful securitisation.  
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6 Conclusions 
 
After analysing the materialization of a concerted European response to the 
economic and financial crisis, this chapter concludes and draws out the 
implications of this study. The main objective of this study was to assess the 
European response to the economic and financial crisis by employing a concept of 
securitization. To realise this objective, the analytical aim was twofold. The 
primary aim of this study was to improve our understanding concerning to what 
extent the international economic and financial crisis was perceived as a security 
threat by European leaders. The secondary aim was to provide a constructivist 
perspective on how we can explain the particular measures taken by the European 
Union and European Council members to address the economic and financial 
crisis. 
As presented in the introduction, two research questions, and two clarifying 
subsidiary questions were attached to this formulation of the problem. The 
answers to these questions have been discussed in the previous chapters and will 
be summarised in this section.  
 
To what extent is the international economic and financial crisis 
perceived as a “security threat” by European leaders? 
 
A crucial element in security studies is the “security threat”.  Within the economic 
sector a security threat is usually based on data, theories and policies. This 
information does not create the threat or a desirable situation, as it merely 
describes a specific situation. It is the securitising actor that interprets the 
information, according to his or her norms and values, and defines the issue as a 
security threat. (Campbell, McConnell & Brue 2005:8-10) During the autumn the 
perception of the security threat evolved considerably. In mid-October, when the 
European Action Plan was adopted, the crisis was presented as an extraordinary 
event and above everyday politics. The European Council moved the issue beyond 
scope of normal politics and presented the crisis as a threat to the “crucial 
economic role of the financial system” (EC 13.10.2008). In a broader security 
context the crisis threatened to undermine the state, as tax revenues may have 
decreased, and resources were transferred to the ailing financial system. Hence, 
the European leaders indicated that the crisis poses a threat to the welfare state 
itself.    
The Council and the Commission also emphasized the international character 
of the crisis. The disruption in the U.S. credit market had spread across the globe 
and exposed systemic deficiencies in the financial system. Hence, the particular 
character of the crisis required an international response to remove the systemic 
risks associated with the threatening development. (EC 13.10.2008) As 
international concerted action constitutes a prerequisite to address the crisis, the 
concept of security was transformed beyond the state. The crisis reflects a 
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where the economic and financial sovereignty of the state has become an integral 
part of the international financial system.  Hence, European leaders acted in order 
to remove the systemic threat by reforming the international financial system. 
(Council of the European Union 07.11.2008) The crisis was framed as an 
imminent threat: a point of no return. This could only be avoided by “concerted, 
swift and decisive” international action (EC 13.10.2008). In other words, the crisis 
poses an imminent and existential threat to the crucial role of the international 
financial system.  
However, during the autumn the perception of the security threat evolved. In 
the beginning of December the European Council approved the European 
Economic Recovery Plan which states that the systemic impact of the financial 
crisis has spread to non-financial sectors. (EC 17271/08) As the Council declared 
that the imminent threat of the financial crisis had diminished, they changed the 
focus from the financial crisis to the economic downturn. Hence, the real 
economy, instead of the financial sector, became the main object of reference. The 
Council also made a new security claim. The new security threat was not the 
“financial crisis”, but the “recessionary spiral” (EC 17271/08).  This threat is 
framed as significant and potentially harmful as it may have severe implications 
on economic activity and employment in Europe.  
The transition from one threat to another reflects how the crisis developed 
throughout the autumn. The crisis was first perceived as an existential threat to the 
crucial role of the international financial system. But as the crisis evolved and 
non-financial sectors became affected the threat was redefined as a “recessionary 
spiral”. This transition reflects the evolution of the crisis from turmoil in the 
financial markets to recession. Thus, the economic and financial crisis was 
perceived as an evolving but imminent security threat. 
 
How can we explain, by employing a concept of securitisation, the 
extraordinary measures taken by the European Union to address the 
crisis?  
 
In order to implement the extraordinary measures included in the concerted 
European response the Council and the Commission needed the approval from the 
esoteric community. Their acceptance was in other words crucial to the success of 
the securitising move. (European Parliament 16.12.2008) Thus the European 
leaders framed the crisis as above everyday politics and moved the issue beyond 
the scope of normal politics. The economic and financial crisis was presented as 
an imminent threat and the European leaders offered deliverance through the 
adoption of extraordinary measures. However, there were several factors that 
facilitated the audience acceptance of the concerted European response.  
First of all, the particular position of the actor determines if the actor could be 
regarded as the accepted voice of security. As the Council consists of heads of 
state and government they should be perceived as the accepted voice of security in 
a crisis situation. More significantly it is the members rather than the institution 
that should be perceived to hold this particular position. However, the 
Commission is not generally perceived in the same way. The wider audience 
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perceive the government, rather than the Commission, as the dominant voice of 
security. In an economic and financial context, the Commission clearly constitutes 
an authority within the esoteric community. Hence the European institution 
should also be perceived as an accepted voice of security. 
Secondly, a securitising actor is more likely to succeed if the issue is referred 
to objects that are historically or generally perceived as threatening. If the 
audience accepts that the existential threat is similar or resonates with objects that 
are generally or historically perceived as threatening, they may accept the security 
claim. (Stritzel 2007:364) European leaders frequently linked the economic and 
financial crisis to earlier episodes that is inter-subjectively held as threatening. 
(Independent 13.10.2008) By referring the crisis to previous “threats” they acted 
to provide a linkage between the inter-subjective sentiments of these episodes and 
the economic and financial crisis. This attachment of negative sentiments 
facilitated the audience acceptance.  
Finally, the economic and financial crisis did not necessarily pose a real 
existential threat to the economic and financial system. However, it was presented 
as such a threat by European leaders. By referring to the crisis as something 
existentially threatening European policy-makers moved to legitimise measures 
that during normal circumstances would have been considered impossible. The 
heads of state and government, and the Commission, thus securitised the 
economic and financial crisis in order to justify the implementation of 
extraordinary measures to arrest the threatening development. However, the 
adoption of the concerted European response was not preceded by a referendum. 
Hence, the wider audience were not consulted before the adoption of the 
extraordinary measures. It is thus difficult to determine if the securitised move 
was accepted by the exoteric society. In other words, as the concerted European 
response was accepted by esoteric community and later adopted by all Member 
States we may define the securitising move by the European leaders as partially 
successful. A thorough evaluation of the success of the securitised move should 
provide more substantial results. However, such a study would have to take into 
account succeeding elections in all Member States. The final conclusions should 
thus be that the Heads of State and Government, and the Commission, 
successfully securitised the economic and financial crisis within the esoteric 
community in order to justify the implementation of the Concerted European 
Response.   
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7 Executive summary  
 
What began as a credit market disruption in 2007 soon led to the most severe 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. Originating primarily in the United 
States, the crisis proved to be highly contagious and complex. (Fender et al. 
2008:1)   Following the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brother a 
growing sense of crisis spread across the globe. The investment bank which had 
incurred huge losses on sub-prime and other lower-rated mortgage backed 
securities declared bankruptcy after financial authorities refused to intervene. The 
demise of the fourth biggest U.S. investment bank reinforced the already 
foreboding atmosphere in the financial markets. (BBC News 20.09.2008)  To 
avoid a collapse of the international financial system, governments all across the 
world adopted unprecedented measures to arrest the threatening development. As 
the threat to economic stability was closely related to the problems in the financial 
sector, policy responses were predominantly focused on banks and financial 
institutions and markets and the flow of credit to households and businesses. A 
variety of measures were taken in quick succession to counter threats to the 
stability of individual financial and banking institutions. Despite the dramatic 
actions adopted by national authorities the situation deteriorated further and it 
soon became evident that a concerted European response to economic and 
financial crisis was inevitable. (Fender et al 2008:13)  
This study seeks to assess measures taken by the European Union to address 
the economic and financial crisis. To realise this objective, the analytical aim was 
twofold. The primary aim of this study was to improve our understanding 
concerning to what extent European leaders perceived the international economic 
and financial crisis as a security threat. The secondary aim was to provide a 
constructivist perspective on how we can explain the particular measures taken by 
the European Union and European Council members to address the crisis.  
 
 
7.1 Theoretical considerations 
 
The theoretical framework employed to assess this process is based on a theory 
of securitisation. Securitisation refers to a public issue that is framed as 
extraordinary event or as above everyday politics. Securitisation moves a public 
issue beyond the conventional scope of politics. Traditionally security analysis 
adopts a realist perspective of security issues where the state constitutes the main 
object of reference. (Buzan et al 1995:25)  However, in order to analyse the 
financial crisis through a security perspective this study moves away from this 
perspective and introduces a new conceptualisation of the referent object.  
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The theoretical framework incorporates a concept initially developed Ludwig 
Fleck regarding thought communities. Fleck introduces two important 
epistemological concepts: the “thought collective” and “thought style”. He 
describes the thought collective as “a community of persons mutually exchanging 
ideas of maintaining intellectual interaction”, and thought style as “a definite 
constraint on thought”. (Fleck 1979:39) Within the thought collective, Fleck 
identifies two different communities. The esoteric community comprised by 
experts producing social facts, and the exoteric community which is comprised by 
the wider society, interpreting and accepting social facts. (Fleck 1979:13) In this 
study the esoteric community is comprised by Governments, Parliaments, 
European Commission and other financial authorities. Within the esoteric 
community these actors are perceived as legitimate to make security claims. 
However, security claims or social facts are conditioned by the social structure 
within the thought community. Governments, in general, are perceived to hold a 
dominant position within the esoteric community. As they are also perceived as 
the accepted voice of security within the exoteric community they constitute the 
main referent object in this study. Albeit, the Commission, in many ways, is 
perceived by the esoteric community as a dominant voice of security in economic 
matters, the exoteric community has an ambiguous perception of its authority. The 
wider audience perceive the government, rather than the Commission, as the 
dominant voice of security. The Commission is thus a subordinated actor within 
the exoteric community. Nevertheless, as the Commission clearly constitutes a 
political and financial authority within the esoteric community it is perceived as a 
referent object in this study.   
 
 
7.2 Key findings 
 
During the autumn the perception of the security threat evolved considerably. 
In mid-October, when the European Action Plan was adopted, the crisis was 
presented as an extraordinary event and above everyday politics. As international 
concerted action was perceived by the European leaders to constitute a 
prerequisite to address the crisis, the concept of security was transformed beyond 
the state. The crisis was framed as an imminent threat: a point of no return. That 
could only be avoided by “concerted, swift and decisive” international action. (EC 
13.10.2008) In other words, the crisis posed an imminent and existential threat to 
the crucial role of the international financial system. However, during the next 
few months the perception of the security threat evolved.  
In the beginning of December the European Council approved the European 
Economic Recovery Plan which declared that the systemic impact of the financial 
crisis had spread to non-financial sectors. (EC 17271/08) As the Council declared 
that the imminent threat of the financial crisis had diminished, they changed the 
focus from the financial crisis to the economic downturn. This transition reflects 
the evolution of the crisis from turmoil in the financial markets to recession. Thus, 
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the economic and financial crisis was perceived as an evolving but imminent 
security threat. 
In order to implement the extraordinary measures included in the concerted 
European response the European Council and the European Commission needed 
the approval from the esoteric community. Their acceptance was in other words 
crucial to the success of the securitising move. However, there were several 
factors that facilitated the audience acceptance of the concerted European 
response.  
First of all, the particular position of the actor determines if the actor could be 
regarded as the accepted voice of security. (Stritzel 2007:364) As the Council 
consists of heads of state and government they should be perceived as the 
accepted voice of security in a crisis situation. More significantly it is the 
individual members rather than the institution that should be perceived to hold this 
particular position. However, the Commission is not generally perceived in the 
same way. The wider audience perceives the government, rather than the 
Commission, as the dominant voice of security. In an economic and financial 
context, the Commission clearly constitutes an authority within the esoteric 
community. Hence, the European institution should also be perceived as an 
accepted voice of security. 
Secondly, a securitising actor is more likely to succeed if the issue is referred 
to objects that are historically or generally perceived as threatening. If the 
audience accepts that the existential threat is similar or resonates with objects that 
are generally or historically perceived as threatening, they may accept the security 
claim. (Stritzel 2007:364)  During the autumn European leaders frequently linked 
the economic and financial crisis to earlier episodes that is inter-subjectively held 
as threatening. By referring the crisis to previous “threats” they acted to provide a 
linkage between the inter-subjective sentiments of these episodes and the 
economic and financial crisis. This attachment of negative sentiments facilitated 
the audience acceptance.  
Finally, the economic and financial crisis did not necessarily pose a real 
existential threat to the economic and financial system. However, it was presented 
as such a threat by European leaders. By referring to the crisis as something 
existentially threatening European policy-makers moved to legitimise measures 
that during normal circumstances would have been considered impossible. The 
heads of state and government, and the Commission, thus securitised the 
economic and financial crisis in order to justify the implementation of 
extraordinary measures to arrest the threatening development. However, the 
adoption of the concerted European response was not preceded by a referendum. 
Hence, the wider audience were not consulted before the adoption of the 
extraordinary measures. It is thus difficult to determine if the securitised move 
was accepted by the exoteric society. In other words, the Heads of State and 
Government, and the Commission, successfully securitised the economic and 
financial crisis within the esoteric community in order to justify the 
implementation of the Concerted European Response.   
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